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It might have been Pascal (Pensées, 347)1 who, unwittingly, 
best formulated the synthesis of man: “a thinking reed”. Although other 
animals might have a “voice”, they do not have a “speech” (logos); in 
other words, they cannot express logically and rationally what they think.  
If we examine the history of the roseau pensant, we will see 
that man has always had to fight a never-ending battle to be allowed to 
express what he thinks, whether it be by gestures, silence, speech, 
cartoons, stickers on vehicles or countless other ways. To preserve the 
freedom of ideas and thought, man has had to struggle, to resist (LASKI, 
1937, p. 94).2 Resist, first, religious tyranny, then State tyranny, and 
finally the tyranny of social groups. If his thoughts were in disagreement 
with those of the Church, man was guilty of heresy; if they clashed with 
the State’s, he was a rebel; if his ideas and actions were different from 
most, he had to be silenced. Many time has man had to fight against the 
tyranny of both State and Church, joined to stifle him.  
A careful analysis of modern political Constitutions, starting 
from the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, considered by Karl 
Loewenstein (1959, p. 4) to be the first modern written Constitution,3 will 
show that the fundamental rights were implemented gradually, along 
time. Thus, the 1689 English Bill of Rights granted freedom of speech only 
                                                 
1 PASCAL, Blaise. Pensées. “L’homme n’est qu’un roseau, le plus faible de la nature; 
maisc’estunroseaupensant” Disponívelem: http://www.croixsens.net/pascal/index.phpH. 
Acesso em: 26.11.07 
 
2 LASKI, Harold J., enfatiza que, no fundo, o segredo da liberdade de pensamento 
(freedom of mind) está na coragem de resistir (Liberty in the modern state. London: 
Penguin Books, 1937, p. 94).  
 
3 LOEWENSTEIN, Karl. Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungspraxis der Vereinigten Staaten. 
Berlin: Springer, 1959, S. 4: “... die Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, erlassen in 
Hartford im Jahre 1638, kann wohl als die erste geschiebene Verfassung gelten und geht 
zeitlich dem mutterländischen Instrument of Government von Cromwell (1654) vor”. 
Georg JELLINEK lembra que as Fundamental Orders of Connecticut exerceram influência 
na elaboração do Agreement of the People inglês (Teoría general del estado. Trad, 
Fernando de los Rios. Montevidéu: Julio César Faira, Editor, 2005, p. 631).   
 
 





to people’s representatives, whether in Parliament or outside it.4 The 1789 
Declaration of Rights of Man and of Citizens, under the influence of the 
Enlightenment, expanded the right to free speech:  
La libre communication des pensées et des opinions est 
un des droits les plus précieux de l’Homme: tout 
Citoyen peut donc parler, écrire, imprimer librement, 
sauf à répondre de l’abus de cette liberté dans les cas 
déterminés par la Loi (Art. 11). 
 From then on, countless documents of international reach, 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights issued by UN’s General 
Assembly (1948) and the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights (1950), have been consolidating and improving the right to 
free speech and communication.  
Even though free speech originated in England, it was in the 
United States that it reached its zenith. In 1695, when the Licensing Act 
became extinct, there was no longer the need to obtain previous 
permission from the Stationer’s Company5 or from the Church to publish 
books in Great Britain. But criticism to public officials in periodicals was 
still subject to court action. In Colonial America there is a famous, 
therefore frequently quoted case, involving freedom of the press. John 
Peter Zenger, the owner of a New York weekly paper, published a series of 
articles criticizing the city’s English governor. He was sued for libel. In the 
English tradition, he was submitted to a grand jury that did not indict him 
– the facts published had been true… 
                                                 
4 That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be 
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament.  
 
5 A guilda Stationer’s Company, de editores e vendedores de livros, foi fundada em 1403, 
obtendo o monopólio real em 1557 (Disponível em: 
Hhttp://encyclopedia.farlex.com/Stationer's+Company. Acesso em: 25.01.08 
 
 





Freedom of speech and communication may involve delicate 
questions that are most of the times difficult to solve. Does the 
Government have the right to self-promotion? Does the tax-payer have 
the right to stop tax paying? Do I have the right to make and show a 
pornographic or obscene film? Can I start a blog preaching atheism? 
Racial hatred? Homosexualism? Can a company that produces alcoholic 
beverages, having spent millions of dollars on neuromarketing, 
legitimately advertise on TV its undoubtedly harmful products?  
When the United States Constitution was elaborated, the 
federalists, with a view to winning the anti-federalists’ (later 
“Republicans”) support to get the Constitution ratified by the Member-
States, promised to make constitutional amendments that would 
guarantee the fundamental rights, which had not been expressly protected 
in the original 1787 text. In 1789, during the first legislature of the 
Congress, 78 proposals for constitutional amendments were discussed. 
The House of Representatives passed 17. In Senate, that number was 
reduced to 12, Finally, on December 15, 1791, the state assemblies 
ratified only 10, which became known as the Bill of Rights.    
Certainly, the First Amendment to the Bill of Rights is the most 
important of all the ten first amendments to the American Constitution, as 
it deals with “freedom of speech”, which sets “the thinking reed” apart 
from other animals.     
The First Amendment confirms that the Congress is forbidden 
to make a law establishing an official religion (as formally happens in 
England), banning, as well, any act abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press. The freedom of belief, which is the cement that binds together 
all freedoms of speech, is not expressly stated in the First Amendment. It 
is implicit (NOWAK, ROTUNDA, 2007, p. 599). 





Madison, the main author of the Constitution, who was familiar 
with the French constitutionalists, proposed, on June 8th, 1789, the 
following text for the future First Amendment: “The people shall not be 
deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their 
sentiments, and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of 
liberty, shall be inviolable.”  
As can be noticed, the wording is extensive and, in the French 
fashion, subjectively praises the press, one of the great bulwarks of 
liberty.  
The text was rejected by the House of Representatives’ Special 
Committee. In the Senate, the proposed constitutional clause was altered. 
When the First Amendment was proposed, Sir William 
Blackstone’s (1723-1780) ideas predominated and had already been 
influenced by Locke’s (1632-1704) and John Milton’s (1608-1674) beliefs. 
Blackstone, in his magnificent work Commentaries on the Laws of 
England,6 took a stand against any previous censorship to the press. He 
admitted, however, a posteriori punishment, particularly if the news 
published was improper, mischievous, or illegal. Madison himself, as 
recorded in the on the Annals of Congress (n. 434), had already endorsed 
the Blackstonian view:  
                                                 
6 Os Commentaries podem ser consultados na íntegra pela Internet 
(Hhttp://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/H 
 





The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a 
free state. But this consists in laying no previous restraints 
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for 
criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an 
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before 
the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the 
press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or 
illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity. 
For many years, freedom of speech prevailed in the United 
States with limitations. The existing rule was: there must be no previous 
restraint. The truth is that between 1791, when the Bill of Rights was 
ratified, and the United States’ entering the First World War, very few 
cases involving freedom of the press arrived at the Supreme Court. With 
the War, however, pacifists and religious people started urging the young 
not to enlist by means of letters and leaflets. They would picket and put 
up posters. The Congress, fearing disastrous consequences, passed two 
laws that made those activities a crime (Espionage Act and Sedition Act). 
The Supreme Court gave a new interpretation to the free speech and free 
press clauses of the First Amendment. Oliver Holmes Jr. (1841-1935) and 
Louis Brandeis (1856-1941) created a criterion to validate or not antiwar 
behavior: if there was Clear and Present Danger, the protection of the 
First Amendment could not be invoked. Thus, the right to free speech in 
circular letters and leaflets advocating opposition to the draft was 
discussed in the Schenck v. United States case, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 
(1919). HOLMES stated in his opinion:  
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the 
defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would 
have been within their constitutional rights. But the 
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in 
which it is done. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 205, 
206. The most stringent protection of free speech would not 
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and 





causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an 
injunction against uttering word that may have all the effect 
of force. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 
418, 439. The question in every case is whether the words 
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a 
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will 
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right 
to prevent. 
At the beginning of the 1950 decade, Clear and Present 
Danger was revised (NOWAK/ROTUNDA, 2007, p. 625). In the 60’s, Fred 
Vinson (1890-1953) reformulated Holmes and Brandeis’ theory: it fell 
upon the Government to demonstrate  “substantial interest” in waiving the 
protection of the First Amendment. Felix Frankfurter (1882-1965) pointed 
out that the Clear and Present Danger theory was flawed by its inflexibility 
(NOWAK/ROTUNDA, 2007, p. 625).  
Regarding freedom of the press, newspapers and magazines 
were always wary of publishing news against public agents. Though it was 
the responsibility of the press to divulge the public administration’s 
dishonest acts, keeping citizens well informed, the publications ran the 
risk of the public authority bringing a libel suit against them. On March 
29th, 1960, there was an incident that resulted in a new concept of 
freedom of the press. On that day, the New York Times published a report 
entitled Heed Their Rising Voices, with the objective of raising funds for 
the defense of the black leader Martin Luther King, accused of tax evasion 
(Alabama). The chief of Montgomery’s police, Commissioner Sullivan, 
despite not having been named in the report, felt that it had harmed his 
honor. Consequently, he filed a libel action. The Circuit Court of 
Montgomery County granted him damages of  $500,000. The sentence 
was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama, which saw the news 
published by the paper as libelous per se, where falsity and malice are 
presumed. There had been, according to the sentence, “irresponsibility” 





on the part of newspaper, which had files where the correctness of the 
facts described in the paid advertisement could have been verified. 
However, the New York Times had had not such concern, acting in 
reckless disregard of the truth. The Supreme Court of the United Stares, 
when judging the case (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan), had to address 
several issues, including some related to constitutional jurisdiction: did the 
Fist Amendment also apply to laws made by state assemblies or only to 
those made by the Congress? 
Ronald DWORKIN (1996, p. 196), several years after the 1968 
decision, hailed the New York v. Sullivan case as a modern foundation of 
the American law of free speech. It fell upon Justice William Brennan Jr. to 
speak for the Court. This Supreme Court landmark brought about a 
discussion on how responsible a vehicle for news and ideas is for what it 
publishes. How liable are the owners of a newspaper or magazine for facts 
published without prior checking? Here is where the question of onus 
probandi comes into the picture: does it fall upon the publication to prove 
that it has not acted with malice or recklessly? Is actual malice7 required 
so that the publication can be convicted in the case of a legal suit claiming 
harm to the honor of a public official? How far can legal suits filed by 
public officials against newspapers and magazines be legally limited if 
several of those suits may only have the purpose of redressing harm done 
to their honor rather than financial compensation? Can a state’s libel law 
(such as, in the concrete case, Alabama’s) apply the First Amendment that 
mentions the “Congress”? Shouldn’t the 14th Amendment be used instead?  
Evidently, the delicate issue of malice in fact or actual malice 
had already been discussed in several cases prior to New York Times Co. 
                                                 
7 Como no direito brasileiro, o direito americano distingue entre “dolo direto” (actual 
malice ou malice in fact) e “dolo eventual” (malice in law). A propósito, confira BLACK, 
Henry Campbell. Black’s law dictionary. St. Paul Minn.: West Publishing Co, 1979, p. 863.   
 





v. Sullivan8. However, even though before that trial there might have 
been a few opinions the importance of a free press, it was only with New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan that the Supreme Court guaranteed the 
protection of a press which might not have been all too precise about the 
facts published or was even “hasty” when reporting news. The possibility 
of having to pay fat compensations for libel or defamation cannot but be a 
barrier to the action of a free press. The fear of a court sentence – more 
civil than criminal in fact - can prevent any criticism of public organs, 
which do not always have the collective interest in mind. That is why 
BRENNAN Jr.’s opinion stated that “(...) the fear of damage awards under 
a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly 
more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute...” 
9The New York Times decision was so important that books on the case 
were published immediately after it. There were those who doubted 
whether the Watergate investigation would have been successful had it no 
been for the New York Times (DWORKIN, 1996, p. 195/6) case.10 In fact, 
the espionage carried out by President Nixon’s aids in the Democratic 
National Committee headquarters at the Watergate hotel complex led the 
Supreme Court, in July 1974, to allow the publication of the President’s 
private papers and tapes, understanding that the Government had not 
proved that disclosing such data put the country’s interests at risk.   
In New York Times, BRENNAN, aware of the importance of the 
precedent being set, warned when starting his opinion: 
 (…) We are required in this case to 
determine for the first time the extent to which the 
constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s 
                                                 
8 Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 618, 446 (1955); Phoenix 
Newspaper, Inc. v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 277, 278 (1957).  
 
9 The fear of damage awards (...) may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of 
prosecution under a criminal statute.  
 
10 Anthony LEWIS, autor de Gideon’s Trumpet, escreveu o livro Make no law: The 
Sullivan case and the first amendment, em sucessivas edições pela Random House. 





power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public 
official against critics of his official conduct.11 
However, even in a country where democracy is well 
consolidated like the United States, the fundamental rights must be 
watched over, even though they may have over two hundred centuries of 
positive constitutional use. More than one attempt has been made to 
change the redaction of the First Amendment. Since 1989 there have been 
notorious moves to alter the First Amendment to ban flag burning, which 
is seen by the Supreme Court as freedom of expression. In Street v. New 
York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), for instance, a young man, indignant when 
hearing on a radio broadcast that a black leader had been assassinated, 
set fire to the national flag in public. His act was typified as crime. The 
Supreme Court, however, understood that no matter how peculiar and 
insane the gesture might have been, the youth had exercised his right to 
free expression, guaranteed by the First Amendment. In his opinion, 
Justice HARLAN stated: 
We add that disrespect for our flag is to be deplored no less 
in these vexed times than in calmer periods of our history. 
Cf. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 (1907).  Nevertheless, 
we are unable to sustain a conviction that may have rested 
on a form of expression, however distasteful, which the 
Constitution tolerates and protects. 
In another case - United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 
(1990) - the Supreme Court, once again led by William Brennan Jr., 
supported by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Scalia e Kennedy, decided that 
the burning of the North-American flag, prohibited by a 1989 law,12 was a 
                                                 
11 We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which the 
constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to award damages in 
a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. 
12 Flag Protection Act. A Constituição Federal brasileira, em seu art. 13, § 1.º, tem a 
bandeira como um dos símbolos nacionais. A Lei n. 5.700/1971, alterada pela Lei n. 
8.421/1992, em seu art. 31, considera como contravenção penal manifestação de 





legitimate manifestation of the right to free political expression, protected 
by the First Amendment. The same line of thought had been used in the 
preceding Texas v. Johnson. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
In June 2006, by one single vote, the Senate failed to pass a 
proposal to change the First Amendment to include a ban on the burning 
of the national flag. If the proposal had passed, it would have made it 
impossible to preserve the Supreme Court judgments on freedom of 
expression, a fierce battle won over centuries. There is no doubt that the 
inclusion of the criminalization of flag burning in the First Amendment will 




Jan. 25 2008 
Available in: http:// www.croixsens.net/pascal/index.php. Accessed Nov. 
26 2006  
BLACK, Henry Campbell. Law dictionary. St. Paul Minn: West Publishing 
Co, 1979. 
BLACKSTONE, William. Commentaries on the laws of England (Internet: 
http: //www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/). 
DWORKIN, Ronald. Freedom’s law: the moral reading of the American 
constitution. Harvard University Press, 1996. 
JELLINEK, GEORG. Teoría general del estado. Trad, Fernando de los Rios. 
Montevidéu: Julio César Faira, Editor, 2005. 
                                                                                                                                                        
desrespeito aos símbolos nacionais. A destruição da bandeira, todavia, configura um 
crime, apenado com pena de detenção de 2 a 4 anos (Decreto-lei n. 898/1969, art. 44).   
 





LASKI, Harold j. Liberty in the moden state. London: Penguin Books, 
1937. 
LEWIS, Anthony. Make no law: the Sullivan case and the first amendment. 
Random House. 
LOEWNSTEIN, Karl. Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungpraxis der 
Vereiningten Staaten. Berlin: Springer, 1959. 
NOWAK, Jonh, ROTUNDA, Ronald. Principles of constitutional law. 3. ed. 
St. Paul, MN: Thomsom/ West, 2007.    
PASCAL, Blaise. Pensées. Avaiable at: 
http://www.croixsens.net/pascal/index.php. Accessed in Nov. 26 07. 
 
